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Abstract 
When making decisions, people sometimes deviate from normative standards.  While 
such deviations may appear to be alarmingly common, examining individual differences 
may reveal a more nuanced picture.  Specifically, the personality factor of need for 
cognition (i.e., the extent to which people engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive 
activities; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) may moderate decision makers’ susceptibility to bias, 
as could personality factors associated with being a leader.  As part of a large-scale 
assessment of high-level leaders, participants completed a battery of decision-making 
competence and personality scales.  Leaders who scored higher on need for cognition 
performed better on two of four components of a decision-making competence measure: 
framing and honoring sunk costs.  In addition, the leader sample performed better than 
published controls.  Thus, both individual differences in need for cognition and 
leadership experience moderate susceptibility to decision biases.  Implications for 
broader theories of individual differences and bias are discussed. 
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Individual Differences in Need for Cognition 
and Decision-making Competence Among Leaders 
Traditional economic theories of behavior have assumed that people integrate all 
available information to rationally determine the utility of decision outcomes (Nash, 
1950; Simon, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).  However, half a century of 
research in psychology, economics, and related fields has shown that real decision 
makers often deviate systematically and predictably from normative standards of rational 
decision-making (Edwards, 1953; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Simon, 1957; Camerer & 
Thaler, 1995).  For example, people tend to be risk-seeking when a decision problem is 
described as a choice between two losses but risk-averse when the same problem is 
described as a choice between two gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  Instead of 
attending solely to future risks and rewards, people tend to be affected by their past 
investments (that is, by “sunk costs”) when allocating resources (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; 
Staw, 1976).    Despite these biases, people are often overconfident of their decision-
making abilities (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). 
On the surface, such deviations from rational decision-making appear alarmingly 
common.  Yet examining individual differences may reveal a more nuanced picture.  
Specifically, such personality factors as need for cognition, or the extent to which people 
engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activities (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), may 
moderate susceptibility to decision biases (Smith & Levin, 1996; Stanovich & West, 
1999).   
Need for Cognition NEED FOR COGNITION AND DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE 3 
Need for cognition (NC) is conceptualized as the tendency to engage in and enjoy 
effortful cognitive activities (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).  Those high in NC engage in 
cognitively challenging activities without external motivation, whereas those low in NC 
prefer to engage in cognitive tasks only when they have a good reason to do so.  Those 
low in NC are more likely to rely on simple cues (Haugtvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1992) 
and stereotypes when making judgments, whereas those high in NC are more likely to 
fully consider all relevant information.  
Notably, higher NC does not necessarily lead to better decisions. NC leads to 
increased thinking, so if thoughts are biased to begin with, increased NC does not 
guarantee better decisions (for a broader review of depth of thought and susceptibility to 
bias, see Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).  In fact, biases caused by effortful thinking, such as 
explicit priming, can be exacerbated by higher NC (Petty & Jarvis, 1996) because 
increased thinking about the prime creates additional opportunities for bias (Petty, et al., 
2008).  In sum, NC is not expected to eliminate all biases, but rather certain biases that 
arise from overreliance on cognitive shortcuts (e.g., framing biases; Smith & Levin, 
1996, Petty & Jarvis, 1996). 
Decision-making Competence 
  The present research examined four domains of decision-making competence: 
resistance to framing, confidence calibration, consistency in risk perception, and 
sensitivity to sunk costs.  Resistance to framing and consistency in risk perception assess 
a criterion of consistency, whereas sensitivity to sunk costs and confidence calibration 
assess an accuracy criterion (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007). NEED FOR COGNITION AND DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE 4 
Susceptibility to framing.  Framing effects, identified by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981), occur when two choice problems that are logically equivalent elicit different 
choices due to subtle changes in language.  A classic example is the “Asian disease 
problem,” which asks participants to choose between two programs of medical treatment 
for a disease outbreak expected to kill 600 people (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  When 
the two treatments are presented in terms of lives lost, subjects tend to be risk seeking, 
preferring the treatment that has a 1/3 probability of no lives lost (but a 2/3 probability of 
600 lives lost) over a treatment that will definitely cause the loss of 400 lives.  However, 
when these treatments are presented in terms of lives saved, preferences reverse: saving 
200 lives with certainty is preferred over the risky treatment, which may save either 600 
lives or none.   
Confidence calibration.  Overconfidence, a highly prevalent bias, has contributed 
to catastrophic decisions, such as the Challenger explosion and the Chernobyl accident 
(Plous, 1993, p. 217).  Confidence calibration is defined as the extent to which 
confidence matches accuracy when measured across many judgments (Fischhoff, Slovic, 
& Lichtenstein, 1977).  People typically report confidence levels nearly 20 percent higher 
than their accuracy levels (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977), but calibration can be better 
among experts—such as weather forecasters and expert bridge players—who know a 
great deal about the relevant domain and who receive timely feedback about their 
judgments (Ronis & Yates, 1987). 
Consistency in risk perception.  People’s perceptions of risk are often inaccurate 
(Lichtenstein et al., 1978; Slovic, 1987; Johnson & Tversky, 1983).  Inaccuracies can 
arise from lack of facility with probabilities (Peters, 2008) or from risk assessments based NEED FOR COGNITION AND DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE 5 
on salient exemplars (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) or affective cues (Slovic, et al., 
2002).  We define consistency in risk perception as the logical consistency of risk 
judgments in three areas: temporal (for example, judgments of risk for the next year vs. 
the next five years), set/superset (for example, the risk of dying from a terrorist attack vs. 
the risk of death from any cause), and complementarity (for example, probability of 
having a car accident vs. probability of having an accident-free driving record).  
Sensitivity to sunk costs.  Decision makers often show greater willingness to 
continue with an endeavor once resources have already been invested, though objectively 
such prior investments should not influence future investment decisions. This tendency 
has been called escalation of commitment (Staw, 1976), or the sunk-cost bias (Arkes & 
Blumer, 1985). Often, people honor sunk costs to avoid the aversive event of admitting 
that resources were squandered as a result of their decisions (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). For 
example, Arkes and Blumer (1985) showed that patrons who paid full price ($15) for 
season tickets to a theater series attended more performances than did those who  
received a $2 or $7 discount.   
Need for Cognition and Decision-making Competence 
Those high in need for cognition are less likely to rely on superficial cues such as 
question wording when making decisions and are therefore less susceptible to framing 
biases, as when choosing between two cancer treatment options presented in terms of 
gains or losses (Smith & Levin, 1996).  Similarly, high-NC subjects correctly ignored 
whether changes in monetary value were presented as percentages or dollar amounts, 
while those low in NC were influenced by presentation (Chatterjee et al., 2000). Higher NEED FOR COGNITION AND DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE 6 
NC is therefore expected to correlate with increased resistance to framing effects in the 
present study.   
Need for cognition has also been found to moderate the tendency to honor sunk 
costs.  Participants who honored sunk costs (by saying they would continue to watch a 
terrible movie only if they had paid to rent it but not if the movie was free) had lower NC 
than participants who responded normatively by ignoring sunk costs (Stanovich & West, 
1999). Higher NC is therefore expected to correlate with increased resistance to sunk 
costs.   
The literature is mixed on the relationship between need for cognition and 
confidence calibration.  While some previous studies have failed to find a relationship 
between the two (Allwood & Bjorhag, 1990), others have found that higher NC is 
associated with poorer confidence calibration in crystallized knowledge domains, such as 
word recognition (Jonsson & Allwood, 2003).  Given these mixed findings, we did not 
have an a priori prediction of the relationship between NC and performance on the 
confidence calibration task in the present study.  There is also little evidence in the 
literature on the relationship between NC and consistency in risk perception, though 
research in the public health domain has shown that NC moderates the impact of 
messages about the risks of cigarette smoking, with those higher in NC more influenced 
by factual messages and those low in NC more influenced by emotional messages 
(Vidrine, Simmons, & Brandon, 2007).  Given the scant literature, we did not have an a 
priori prediction of the relationship between NC and consistency in risk perception. 
Need for Cognition in High-level Leaders NEED FOR COGNITION AND DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE 7 
In addition to testing our hypotheses about the relationship between NC and 
decision-making competence, the present study pursues the equally important objective 
of testing these processes in a sample of high-level leaders.  None of the previously 
documented associations between NC and decision-making performance have been 
examined in a mature, experienced population, nor in a population of leaders who are 
held accountable for decision outcomes. It is therefore unknown whether a sample of 
high-level decision-makers will show a relationship between NC and decision-making 
competence or whether leaders, regardless of their NC, have learned to avoid decision 
errors through years of practice, thus forestalling such a relationship.  
Despite these qualifications, due to the far-reaching and well-documented effects 
of NC across many domains and populations (Cacioppo et al., 1996) we hypothesized 
that individual differences in NC would, in fact, be pervasive and powerful enough to 
show relationships with decision-making competence, even among highly experienced 
decision makers. 
Method 
Participants 
  One hundred seventy-eight high-level leaders who were visiting the Harvard 
Kennedy School of Government to take part in executive education programs were 
recruited as participants.  Participants came mainly from U.S. state, local, and federal 
government or the U.S. military. Complete responses were obtained from 161 
participants (49 female); this sample was used for all analyses. Participants reported a 
mean age of 46 (SD = 7.73), with a mean of 14 years (SD = 7.64) spent in a leadership NEED FOR COGNITION AND DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE 8 
position.  Seven percent had a high school diploma or some college, 18% had a 
bachelor’s degree, and 75% had a post-graduate degree. 
Materials 
The two primary scales of interest were the 18-item version of the Need for 
Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao 1984) and the Adult Decision-making 
Competence Scale (A-DMC; Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007).  The Need for 
Cognition scale asks participants to rate the extent to which each of 18 items describes 
them on a nine-point Likert scale anchored by “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree”.  
Sample items are “The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me” and “Thinking is 
not my idea of fun” (reverse coded).   
The A-DMC, developed by Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff (2007), assesses 
decision-making competence across several domains, including resistance to framing, 
resistance to sunk costs, consistency in risk perception, and confidence calibration.  The 
resistance to framing and consistency in risk perception components evaluate 
performance based on participants’ consistency between related judgments. In the 
resistance to framing component, participants are asked to indicate preferences for pairs 
of problems that are equivalent in value but described differently (loss or gain frame). 
Scores are calculated by the mean absolute difference ratings for the two problems. 
Consistency in risk perception is measured as the consistency of risk assessments across 
time frames. 
The resistance to sunk costs and confidence calibration components assess 
accuracy relative to an external criterion. Confidence calibration is scored as the absolute 
difference between confidence and accuracy across 14 true/false questions (such as “A NEED FOR COGNITION AND DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE 9 
venture capital fund invests in new businesses by providing startup capital”). The 
confidence calibration score is the absolute difference between average confidence (on a 
100-point percentage scale) and percentage correct across the 14 items. Resistance to 
sunk costs measures participants’ ability to ignore past expenditures when considering 
future options by asking them to choose between an option that represents the 
normatively correct choice versus one that honors sunk costs.  Scores are calculated by 
the average rating across items.   
Procedure 
Participants, who came to the lab in groups of 10-36, were tested in individual 
cubicles. They first completed the Need for Cognition scale, then the resistance to 
framing, resistance to sunk costs, consistency in risk perception, and confidence 
calibration components of the Adult Decision-Making Competence Scale in a fixed 
order.
1  Finally, participants provided demographic information, including information 
about their leadership experience.  Participants received individualized feedback on their 
decision-making performance as an incentive to participate. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses: Validity Checks  
To verify that our sample actually consisted of high-level leaders, we asked 
participants to report how many subordinates they managed (both directly and indirectly) 
and how many years they had spent in a management role. The mean number of direct 
                                                 
1 Participants also completed other measures for the purposes of another project not 
discussed here. More information on these measures can be obtained from the 
corresponding author. NEED FOR COGNITION AND DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE 10 
reports was 68.20 (Mdn = 9); the mean number of indirect reports was 304.85 (Mdn = 
38). Participants reported having spent a mean of 14 years in a management role. We also 
asked participants to rate the following statements on a seven-point Likert scale 
(anchored by “Not at all true about me” and “Very much true about me”): “I can punish 
or reward subordinates,” “I can promote or demote subordinates,” “My opinion is 
accorded considerable respect and attention,” “I am expected to motivate my 
subordinates,” and “I supervise subordinates and evaluate or correct their work as 
necessary.” Responses to these items demonstrated acceptable reliability (a = .77), so we 
averaged them to create a composite measure of subjective workplace status. The modal 
score on this composite was 7, and the mean was 5.8, well above the scale midpoint of 
3.5, t (160) = 25.89, p < .001.  
 
Inferential Analyses: Need for Cognition and Decision-making Competence Among 
Leaders 
To examine the hypothesis that those higher in NC show greater decision-making 
competence, we examined the correlations between NC and each of the four dimensions 
of decision-making competence. Consistent with hypotheses, the results revealed a 
significant correlation between NC and two of the four decision-making dimensions:  
resistance to framing effects and resistance to sunk costs.  Participants with higher NC 
were more resistant to task framing when making choices than were those with lower 
NC, r(161) = .16, p = .04. Participants with higher NC also displayed greater resistance to 
sunk costs, r(161) = .17, p = .03; the higher their NC, the more participants were willing 
to write off sunk costs.  There was no significant correlation between NC and confidence NEED FOR COGNITION AND DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE 11 
calibration, r(161) = .09, p = .26; or NC and consistency in risk perception r(161) = -.13, 
p = .11. 
To examine the hypothesis that the leader sample would show less susceptibility 
to decision biases than would the published control sample from Bruine de Bruin, Parker, 
& Fischhoff (2007), we compared scores from the two samples on each of the four 
dimensions of decision-making competence. The control sample consisted of 360 
residents of the Pittsburgh area.  Women made up 73.8% of respondents.  Educational 
demographics included 2.8% reporting no degree, 44.6% a high school diploma, 13.0% 
reporting an associate’s degree, 29.1% a bachelor’s degree, 9.5% a master’s degree and 
0.9% a doctorate degree (Bruine de Bruine, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007).   Results 
revealed that the leaders outperformed the control group on three out of the four 
dimensions: resistance to framing effects, consistency in risk perception, and resistance to 
sunk costs (see Table 1).  Thus, we conclude that individual differences in leadership 
experience and NC moderate susceptibility to decision biases.   
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
General Discussion 
In a sample of high-level leaders, as predicted, those high in need for cognition  
were less affected by task framing and less swayed by sunk costs than were those low in 
NC. However, NC was not correlated with better confidence calibration or more 
consistent risk perceptions.  
Why might higher NC correlate with reduced sensitivity to framing effects and 
sunk costs, but not with greater confidence calibration or consistency in risk perceptions? 
The answer likely lies in the types of cognitive processes tapped by the different tasks. In NEED FOR COGNITION AND DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE 12 
his taxonomy of judgment biases, Arkes (1991) divides systematic errors in judgment 
into three types: strategy-based, association-based, and psychophysical. Strategy-based 
errors result from the use of simplifying strategies that do not use all the available data. 
Although such strategies often give “good enough” solutions and conserve scarce 
cognitive resources (c.f. Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999), they also 
lead to predictable judgment errors. Association-based errors are the result of automatic 
semantic associations influencing judgment. For example, my confidence in the belief 
that Istanbul is the capital of Turkey may be high due to the automatic activation of 
evidence consistent with it (for example, the fact that Istanbul is Turkey’s largest city).  
(In fact, the capital of Turkey is Ankara). Finally, psychophysical judgment errors result 
from non-linear responses to different levels of gains and losses. If I have already 
invested $1000 in repairing my 1988 Camaro, another $500 repair seems less onerous 
than if I had not already taken the $1000 loss. 
In terms of Arkes’ (1991) framework, the two biases reduced in individuals high 
in NC—framing effects and the sunk-cost bias—are both considered psychophysical 
judgment errors because they result from differential sensitivity to gains and losses 
(framing effects) and in differential sensitivity to losses depending on one’s reference 
point (sunk-cost bias). While it may seem odd that psychophysical judgment errors can 
be overcome by additional thinking, in both cases, a clear decision rule can be applied to 
overcome the “perceptual illusion.” Just as a scale provides a clear answer about an 
item’s actual weight, expected value calculations can be applied regardless of framing to 
determine the correct response (and many of our participants reported doing just that). NEED FOR COGNITION AND DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE 13 
Similarly, following the rule “consider only future costs and benefits” will eliminate the 
perceptual illusion underlying the sunk-cost bias. 
In contrast, confidence calibration is classified as an association-based judgment 
error in the Arkes (1991) framework. Such errors are very difficult, perhaps impossible, 
to “undo” by exerting mental effort. No clear rule can counteract the effect of spreading 
semantic activation on judgment, and even with awareness of bias, it is difficult to 
determine how much one should adjust one’s judgments. In fact, thinking harder about 
reasons supporting one’s choices may make one even more confident that one has 
reached the right answer. 
Consistency in risk perception is more difficult to classify.  While the judgment 
errors that lead to inaccurate risk descriptions may be association-based, internal 
inconsistencies are likely due to strategy-based judgment errors.  For example, air travel 
may be evaluated as riskier than automobile travel due to vivid media reports of plane 
crashes.  However, inconsistency in risk perceptions (such as ascribing a higher 
likelihood of dying in a plane crash in the next year than in the next five years) is likely 
due to a faulty decision strategy that glosses over probability rules.  According to the 
Arkes (1991) framework, raising the costs of using a suboptimal decision strategy (e.g., 
incentives or accountability) may reduce such strategy-based errors.  Future work should 
explore the relationship between NC, costs and benefits of different decision strategies, 
and strategy-based errors. 
Comparing the Decision-making Performance of Leaders to Other Groups 
Comparing the decision-making competence of leaders to a sample of Pittsburgh 
residents reported by Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff (2007) showed that the leader NEED FOR COGNITION AND DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE 14 
sample outperformed the community sample on resistance to framing effects, consistency 
in risk perception, and resistance to sunk costs (regardless of NC level). One reason for 
this may be that leaders were, on average, higher in NC than the control samples—in 
other words, in addition to explaining variance in decision-making ability within the 
sample of leaders, NC might also explain the group-level differences in decision-making 
ability between leaders and controls. It is unlikely that this is the whole story, however, 
because leaders outperformed controls on consistency in risk perception, which we did 
not find to be related to NC. There are, of course, many other possible reasons for the 
between-group differences we observed: Leaders might learn to make better decisions as 
part of their formal or informal training. Differences in education between our sample 
and the less-educated community sample could be responsible, as could underlying 
differences in cognitive ability.  Ongoing research in our laboratory, and in others, is 
currently examining which, if any, of these explanations are correct. 
Why Use Non-undergraduate Samples? 
Many findings on biased patterns of responding in decision-making are based on 
college samples, and understandably so: Undergraduates are cheap and readily available, 
and the inferences researchers wish to draw often are not sample-dependent (c.f. Mook, 
1983). In some cases, however, inferences are sample-dependent. In particular, when one 
wishes to argue that a pattern of biased responding is generally prevalent, or that an 
individual difference generally moderates bias, it is important to turn to use non-student 
samples. Indeed, much prior work suggests that at least some decision-making biases 
may be mitigated in experts (Ronis & Yates, 1987; Shanteau, 1988; Spence & Brucks, 
1997). In addition, using high-level leaders as research participants may also affect how NEED FOR COGNITION AND DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE 15 
seriously non-psychologists take one’s findings; unless leaders are studied, those in 
leadership positions may believe that the typical findings of decision-making research do 
not apply to them (Sears, 1986).  For debiasing prescriptions to have an effect, the work 
must be able to reach leaders, and leaders must be open to the advice.   
Future Research 
Arkes’ (1991) framework provides a framework for understanding why increased 
need for cognition reduces some biases but not others. The present research indicates that 
those with leadership experience can overcome psychophysically based errors with 
increased processing.  Though it should in principle be possible to overcome strategy-
based errors in the same way, further research is needed to determine when this will be 
the case among those with a chronic tendency to think deeply. Our research is continuing 
to investigate decision making among executive leaders, both to extend generalizability 
and to explore individual differences in decision making.  Further research should also 
directly compare the decision-making competence of leaders to that of non-leaders.  
Because decisions made by leaders have such great potential for far-reaching 
consequences, it is important to understand how such decisions are made and how they 
can be improved.  
Summary 
The present findings add to the literature on need for cognition and cognitive bias 
by demonstrating that the relationships between NC and decision-making ability initially 
demonstrated in college students hold in a sample of high-level leaders. Moreover, by 
considering multiple decision tasks within one study, we were able to make inferences 
about the mechanisms underlying bias reduction. The present paper also conceptually NEED FOR COGNITION AND DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE 16 
connects these mechanisms to Arkes’ theory-based taxonomy of error and bias, thus 
facilitating the formation of future hypotheses. 
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Table 1 
Leaders’ Decision-Making Competence Compared to Control Group 
Component  Control M (SD) N  Leader M (SD) N   Cohen’s d          t                 p 
 
Resistance to     3.72 (.61), 360  4.03 (.59), 161   0.517       5.414        < .0001 
Framing 
 
Confidence       .91 (.08), 360  .92 (.07), 161    0.133      1.369        = 0.1717 
Calibration 
 
Consistency in     .70 (.16), 360  .84 (.10), 161    0.919      10.241       < .0001 
Risk Perception 
 
Resistance to      4.40 (.77), 360  4.94 (.87), 161   0.657       7.100         <.0001 
Sunk Costs 
 
 